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pan of the sharecropper, leading to conflicts and an undennining of the trust that had been built 
up over the previous centuries. Therefore, by the early 1920s the contract was often considered 
synonymous with "exploitation" and "impoverishment", tenns frequently found in the more 
traditionalliterature on sharecropping. 
Keywords: agriculture, sharecropping, viticulture. 
* Carmona. Departamento de Historia Económica e Instituciones, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. E-
mail: jucar@eco.uc3m.es; Simpson, Departamento de Historia Económica e Instituciones, Universidad 
Carlos III de Madrid. E-mail: james@eco.uc3m.es 
i 
I~I
 
1 
11 
Ihe "Rabassa Morta" in Catalan viticulture: the rise and decline of a long term 
sharecropping comract. 1670s-1920s. 1 
Juan Carmona and James Simpson 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
Until recentIy, most historians have dwelt on the negative affects of sharecropping 
in southern Europe. In France, for example sharecropping has traditionalIy been considered 
as a major cause of the stagnation of the rural economy in the seventeemh and eighteenth 
centuries. Neither sharecropper or landowner was supposed to have had an incemive to 
make productive investments, and the contract led to an increase in subsistence and a 
dec1ine in commercial agriculture. 2 By contrast, recem work by economic and 
development historians has emphasized the positive characteristics of sharecropping 
contracts over a wide variety of historical and geographical settings. 3 Ihis new literature, 
instead of considering sharecropping as irrational or economicalIy inefficient, stresses 
instead its contribution in reducing transaction costs for both landowner and sharecropper 
in the face of market imperfections. In this paper we try to explain why such diverse 
opinions about sharecropping can be held. We argue that although sharecropping might 
indeed provide a successful solution to market inefficiencies in traditional agriculture, the 
changing nature of the sector during modernization required significant changes in the 
1 We have benefitted from discussioos with Ano Carlos, Josep Colomé, Alan Dye, 
Francesco Galassi, Shawn Kantor, Belen Moreno and Rich Sicotte. Earlier versioos of this 
paper were presented at a congress on "Land, labour and tenure: the iostitutional 
arrangements of conflict and cooperation in comparative perspective" held at the University 
of Leicester in August 1996; at the congress on "Cambio instituticional e historia económica" 
at the Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona in December 1996, and at a seminar at the 
Universidad Carlos In de Madrid. Ihe usual disc1aimers apply. FinalIy, the authors 
acknowledge funding from the Spanish government (pS94-0005). 
2 Désert, 1975-6, pp.440-1 and Hoffman, 1984, pp.309-1O together with the sources he 
cites. For the ltalian literature, see especialIy the bibliography cited in Cohen and Galassi, 
1990, p.646 footnote 2 and Zamagni, 1993, p.70 footnote 58. 
3 Ihe literature on sharecropping is immense. For a recent and easily available survey, see 
Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami, 1992, pp. 1965-2018. 
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nature of the contract. In particular, we suggest that the increase in capital inputs, and the 
growing opportunity cost of labour because of increased urban demand implied that unless 
the institutional evolved to reflect these changes, then conditions for sharecroppers were 
likely to decline, bringing with it the much quoted complaints of "exploitation" and 
"impoverishment" found in the traditionalliterature. 
In Cataluña, in north-eastern Spain, both landowners and sharecroppers were 
convinced that the local sharecropping contract, the rabassa morta, had played a major role 
in the expansion of viticulture in the region from the late seventeenth century until the late 
nineteenth.4 The rabassa morta was unusual in that its duration was usual1y for the life of 
the vineyard, which effectively implied that the contract was indefinite. For several 
centuries the institution was sufficiently flexible to adapt to changing factor markets, and 
the wider changes taking place in society. However, we argue that from the late nineteenth 
century, the increasingly capital intensive nature of viticulture and the divergence of wages 
and wine prices increased significantly the possibilities of postcontractual opportunistic 
behaviour on the part of the sharecropper, and undermined the trust or social capital that 
had been developed over the previous centuries. Although sharecropping continued to be 
used, the conflicts which developed between the principal and agent in their attempts to 
adjust to the new situation raised transaction costs, and therefore reduced significantly the 
efficiency of the contract. 
In conclusion, we argue that although sharecropping contracts in traditional 
agriculture could be surprisingly resilient, the changes that take place with the 
modernization of agriculture were likely to shift rapidly the rewards to one party, at the 
cost of the other. In particular, the growing opportunity cost of the sharecropper's labour 
in the face of rapid urbanization implied that unless contracts could be frequently 
renegotiated, there would be a significant increase in postcontractual opportunistic 
behaviour and criticism of the unjust nature of the contract. 
4 This was true even at the end of the period studied here. See, for example, the editors' 
(Bernaldo de Quirós and Aragón Montojo) report for the Instituto de Reformas Sociales 
(hereafter IRS) 1923, pp.9 and 10. 
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The paper is divided into three sections. After a brief examination of the theory of 
sharecropping and its relevance to viticulture in the first section, the second section shows 
why the long term nature of the rabassa morta contract was suitable to the conditions prior 
to the late the 1880s. The final section considers both why landowners continued to use 
sharecropping contracts after the widespread destruction of viticulture by the disease 
phylloxera and why, especially after the First World War, the contracts were much less 
efficient in providing suitable conditions for competitive viticulture in the region. 
1, Sharecroppin~ and vjticulture. 
In an important paper, Klein, Crawford and Alchian argue that after a specific 
investment has been made and the presence of appropriable cuasi rents created, the 
possibility of postcontractual opportunistic behaviour "is very real".5 Vines are highly 
specialized to land and, at least in part because of possibilities of opportunistic behaviour, 
most vineyards in the Mediterranean basin were worked by landowners using family 
labour, and were therefore small. Wage labour was rarely found except at harvest time, 
because the vast majority of wines were of poor quality and sold cheaply, which would not 
have compensated landowners the relatively high cost of monitoring labour inputs. 
Furthermore, prior to the present century, there were few economies of scale in either the 
production of grapes or wine. Only with a handful of wines, such as the high quality 
sherries, ports and clarets which, for example, sold for eight or ten times more than 
"ordinary" wines on the London market in the 1860s, was their an incentive for 
landowners to establish wine estates.6 
The use of rental contracts would, of course, have resolved the landlord's 
monitoring problems by allowing tenants to enjoy in the form of increased output, all the 
benefits from improved cultivation. Yet rental contracts were rarely found with viticulture 
5 Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1996 ed., p.106. 
6 See Pan-Montojo and Simpson, forthcoming. For example, in Jerez, the Domecq estate 
had 200 acres (80 hectares) of vines in 1831 (Busby, 1833, P.17); in Bordeaux, Chateau 
Margaux in 1922 had 227 acres of vines. Faith, 1991, p.5l. 
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because of the possibilities of postcontractual opportunistic behaviour and moral hazard. In 
the first instance, landowners faced difficulties in determining whether a poor harvest was 
the result of climatic factors, or the agent's idleness.7 In viticulture the problem was made 
even more difficult than with most other crops by the frequently inverse relation between 
harvest size and quality. This problem is solved by the use of sharecropping contracts. 
Second, tenants with contracts of onIy a few years, would be tempted to increase output 
through a light pruning, an action which shortened the vine's productive life. Even with 
long term contracts, the landlord ran the risk of receiving back a dying vineyard once the 
tenant's lease expired.8 Only indefinite contracts would give tenants a long term economic 
interest in the vineyard. However, indefinite contracts, based on a fixed annual payment, 
were likely to lead to distributional conflicts. Future wine prices were impossible to 
forecast, so monetary rents were impractical. Although this problem could be solved by 
using a fixed, annual payment in kind, landlords ran the risk that their relative share of the 
harvest would decline during periods of high wine prices (tenants maximizing output - but 
at the cost of shortening the vineyard I s life), or losing their tenants during those of falling 
prices (tenants considering that the rent was higher than the marginal productivity of their 
labour). 
Indefinite, sharecropping contracts therefore promised to overcome both the 
problems of monitoring, and solve those of moral hazard by providing both parties with a 
direct interest in optimizing output over the life of the vineyard. This situation was 
reinforced in Cataluña, because a peculiar feature of contracts was that the rabasser 
(sharecropper) legally owned the vines. 9 Therefore, although contracts required the 
7 Bardhan, 1984, p. 161, Galassi, 1992, p.82 and Hayami and Otsuka, 1993, p.3. 
8 On occasions, such as the approach of phyIloxera, landowners might wish to maximize 
production even if it implied destroying the vineyard. Evidence suggests that it took about 
five years to exhaust the vines. IRS, 1923, p.92. 
See also Roig Armengol, 1890, p.179. 
9 Whilst emphyteusjs contracts allow the tenant the possibility to sell to a third party the 
right to use the land (gominjum utile), the rabassa mOrta granted ownership of the vines, but 
onIy whilst they were productive. 
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rabasser to cultivate the vines in accordance with the customs of the region, it was the fact 
that the vines were their own property which provide the -best incentive for their proper 
care. 
1O This had two important benefits for the landowner, namely problems of moral 
hazard were significant1y reduced, and monitoring was enforced through the market. 11 As 
a result, at times of high wine prices, the landowner would also benefit from the light 
pruning of vines and greater care provided by the rabasser. By contrast, when prices were 
weaker, the quantity and quality of labour inputs were likely to decline, but in such 
conditions the landowner would have had difficulties finding better tenants. 
One potential problem for both landlords and tenants is that of contract 
enforcement, as not on1y does opportunism have to be detected, but it may have to be 
proved before a court of law. Designing a contract which covers all future contingencies is 
difficult, and recourse to litigation is often slow and expensive. Yet it many traditional 
societies, including eighteenth and ear1y nineteenth century Cataluña, oral contracts were 
frequent. Problems of postcontractual opportunistic behaviour were controlled in Cataluña 
not on1y by dividing the ownership of the land and vines and the use of the market, but also 
through reputation. Residing in small villages, short term opportunism by either party 
would be easi1y identified by others and therefore affect an individual' s reputation within 
the community. 12 So long as sharecroppers identified their economic interests as being 
similar to those of the landlord, and the landlord wished to attract good tenants, then 
reputation played an important role in the successful enforcement of long term contracts. 
On1y from the late nineteenth century would this situation start to change, with both parties 
interests being increasingly directed along class lines, thereby undermining the "good will" 
10 The major constraint on ownership was that the landowner had to approve the purchaser 
in the event of the rabasser wishing to sell and could not sublet. This is in line with KIein, 
Crawford and Alchian (l996ed, p.120) who argue that the "party who plants the trees or 
vines" also usually owns them. 
11 Another important factor, as we shall see, was that until the end of the nineteenth 
century, the rabasser kept about two thirds of the harvest. 
12 In other words, "each agent needs to evaluate the effects of his current actions on his 
reputational capital." Hayami and Otsuka, 1993, p.5? 
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necessary for the sharecropping contracts to operate efficiently, and increasing monitoring 
costs. 
For an institution to last over several centuries, such as was the case of the rabassa 
Il1Q11a, there was the need for considerable flexibility in the face of changing relative prices 
and technology. In the rest of this paper we examine more closely the workings of the 
rabassa morta, dividing the period into two major parts, namely from the introduction of 
the contract with the initial planting of the vineyards from the late seventeenth century to 
phylloxera in the late nineteenth century, and secondly from the replanting of the vines to 
the major conflicts of the 1920s. 
2. Catalan viticulture in the age of expansion: 1670s-1880s. 
The discriminatory taxation by Britain against French wines and spirits from the 
second half of the seventeenth century, and the Dutch ban on French imports with the 
outbreak of war between the two countries in 1672, marked the beginning of an important 
expansion of Catalan viticulture which lasted until the disease phylloxera devastated the 
region' s vines in the late 1880s. 13 Initially, exports from the region consisted mainly of 
spirits (aguardiente), rather than wines themselves. 14 This had three important advantages: 
there were fewer problems of conservation, transport costs when measured by alcoholic 
strength were significantly reduced, and the poor quality of local wines was unimportant if 
they were to be subsequently transformed into spirits. The disadvantage was that 
producers received less for wines which were to be converted into spirits. 15 Consequently, 
from the early nineteenth century an increasing number of producers successfully switched 
to the production and export of table wines, relegating only those wines of poor quality, or 
13 For the intemational wine market, see especially Unwin, 1991, p.238 and Nye, 1991, 
pp.35-9. 
14 A few luxury wines, especially Malmsey, were also produced. However, quantities 
were small and it is sufficient for us to consider only spirits and table wines. 
15 Between 1821-35 the price of wine in San Pere de Ribes was about the same as 
aguardiente in Reus, in spite of the latter being around three times stronger. Colomé and 
Valls, 1994, p.48. 
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those surplus after abundant harvests, to the still. This change was significantIy helped by 
the building of new roads, especially those link.ing areas of production with Barcelona and 
other ports, and improvements in product quality, which in general was achieved with 
existing technologies. 16 
Estimates of the area under vines in Cataluña are both scarce and unreliable. The 
expansion of viticulture appears to have taken place in a series of stages, with the frontier 
starting from the coast in the late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century, before 
moving inland along the valleys. The mountainous interior and poor cornmunications 
implied that the process was slow, despite generally favourable wine prices. Thus the 
major period of expansion in Vilafranca, which is about 20 kilometres from the coast, and 
was the centre of the important wine area of the Penedes, took place between the second 
quarter of the eighteenth and the second quarter of the nineteenth century. 17 By 1860, the 
coastal provinces of Barcelona, Tarragona and Gerona had already reached 88 per cent of 
their maximum extension of vines. The final important movement of the frontier, which 
started from the early 1850s and lasted until the mid 1880s, was driven by a combination of 
rising international wine prices and improvements in internal cornmunications brought 
about by the railways. This time it was the inland province of Lérida which benefitted 
most, where the area of vines doubled from 60 thousand hectares to 120 thousand in just 
twenty five years. 18 By the mid 1880s, and with the beginning of the devastation by 
phylloxera, the four Catalan provinces had around 400 thousand hectares of vines. 19 
16 To help conservation, wines were usually strengthened before exporting or selling in the 
major urban centres. 
17 Moreno (1995, cuadro 1 p.177) suggests 1740 as a starting date, whilst Colomé and 
Valls (1994, cuadro 3 p.50) from about 1725. Barba i Roca (1991 ed., p.75) complained at 
the end of the eighteenth century that the production of aguardiente in Vilafranca was 
restricted because of the poor road between this town and its nearest port, Vilanueva. 
18 Estimates ofthe area under vines are based on Garrabou and Pujol, 1987, pp.80-2 and 
Ministerio de Fomento, 1911, pp. 103-20. 
19 Phylloxera was first noted in the province of Gerona in 1878. It initially spread only 
slowly, in part because the high wine prices encouraged growers to use costIy chemicals in 
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Much of the expansion of viticulture occurred in areas of low population density on 
marginalland, land which ofien had been used as rough pasture or woodland.2o The task 
of land clearing and planting of vines was especially arduous, ofien requiring more than 
250 days labour per hectare.21 In addition there was a wait of four years or so before a 
respectable harvest was forthcoming. One estimate, which does not include the expenses 
of any prior land clearing, gives depreciation and interest costs for planting as equivalent to 
27 per cent of total annual cultivation expenditure over fifiy years.22 This high figure, 
together with the uncertain annual incomes caused by fluctuating yields and prices, would 
have imposed asevere obstacle on the spread of the vine if growers had had to resort to 
capital markets. However, in traditional viticulture, virtually all the planting costs were for 
manuallabour, and it was usual for landowners to plant vines during those times of the 
year when the opportunity cost of family labour was lowest. In Cataluña, by contrast, it 
was the rabasser and his family who cleared the land and planted vines, creating in the 
process an important capital asset for themselves. The rabasser's limited savings, and 
difficulties in obtaining commercialloans, were partly offset by their possibility to cultivate 
subsistence crops between the vines, before they carne into production. 
The rabassa morta contracts, required the rabasser to plant vines within a fixed 
period (usually between two and ten years) on the land that they had been granted, cultivate 
the vines in accordance with the customs of the region (us i costum de bon pagés), and to 
delaying its spread. With the sharp drop in wine prices in the late 1880s, the disease spread 
quickly. See Iglesies, 1968 and Carnero Arbat, 1980. 
20 In 1730, for example, two thirds of allland under vines had previously been 
uncultivated in Alt Penedes, half in Ah Camp and three quarters in Bages. Valls, 1996, 
cuadro 4.6. 
21 The cost of land clearing comes from Garrabou, et.al. 1992, p.47, although they fail to 
give a source. Tax sources for 1879 give 438 days in San Sadurní d'Anoia and 254 in 
L'Anoia. Colomé, 1997, p.324. 
22 IRS, 1923, pp.159-63. Costs are divided almost exactly between ploughing (51.5 per 
cent) and labour (48.5 per cent). No figures are given for the purchase of manure or vines. 
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hand over the previously agreed share of the annual harvest to the owner.23 The contracts 
were originally until two thirds of the vines had died, hence the Catalan name rabassa 
Il1QI1a, meaning "dead vine". This implied that they would last for several generations 
although, until at least the mid nineteenth century, the contracts were effectively indefinite, 
for reasons we shall see.24 
If long term contracts and the rabasser's ownership of the vines helped solved the 
problems of moral hazard, the appropriate division of the harvest was crucial to the 
incentives that the rabasser had in maximizing output over the life of the vineyard. 
Although recent sharecropping literature has dwelt on the fact that the division of. the 
harvest is frequently fixed at an arbitrary 50:50 between the sharecropper and the 
landowner, this was not the case in Cataluña.25 Instead, there was considerable flexibility 
in determining the share of the annual harvest that was payable as rent. As inputs were 
limited almost totally to land and labour in the pre-phylloxera period, the size of the annual 
payment depended on the estimated labour requirements needed to plant the vines and the 
potential fertility of the soil. Because of the heavy use of labour in planting, and the modest 
yields of traditional agriculture in this region, the initial contracts frequently required the 
rabasser to hand over only a small share of the harvest, with between a fifth or a third 
being very cornmon. As a result, the sharecropper received a significant share of the 
marginal product of his labour. 
One of the reasons for the success of the rabassa morta before the twentieth century 
was the absence of economies of scale in traditional viticulture. The size of the rabasser's 
plots were therefore usually small. For example, in Bages, rabassers worked on average 
2.2 hectares, with two thirds working less than 1.5 hectares, whilst in San Sadurní d'Anoia 
23 Giralt, 1964, pp.56-7. 
24 Continuity was guaranteed by the fact that under Catalan inheritance, the ~, 
property passed to a single heir. (Santamaría, 1878, p.xi). 
25 Murrell, 1983 c1aims that the 50% division served as "a golden rule" of justice. See also 
Stiglitz, 1989, p.24, Hayami and Otsuka, 1993, pp.78. 80-1 and Otsuka, Chuma and 
Hayami, 1992, pp. 1969 and 1977. 
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(Penedes), two thirds of the rabassers worked less than 2 hectares, and a third between 2 
and 5 hectares.26 In Gelida (Baix Llobregat) in 1862, although 96 per cent of vines 
belonged to owners who had more than 5 hectares, 78 per cent of aH vines were actually 
fanned in units of less than 5 hectares 27. In Catalan viticulture, ploughs were 
comparatively rare before the late nineteenth century (making the need to own work 
animals unnecessary), only a few hand tools were required (pruning knives, hoes) and, 
until the appearance of new diseases from the 1850s, no chemicals.28 The scale of 
production in wine making was also small, and capital requirements consequently limited, 
aHowing most rabassers to make their own wine. The size of most fennenting vats 
(lagares) was around 50 hectolitres - which represented about 3 hectares, or approximately 
the production of a sharecropper.29 As we have seen, a large part of cornmercial 
production initially was for spirits, and the local stills (Q1ks. and fassines), were cheap in 
construction, required a minimum of skill to operate, although the spirits they produced 
was of a poor quality. However, by the last third of the nineteenth century wine 
production was now of much greater importance, and distilling was limited to either poor 
wine, or surpluses after exceptional harvests. 
Although landawners and rabassers successfuHy devised a contract which overcame 
most problems assaciated with moral hazard, manitaring and incentives, the very length of 
the contract was a potential problem, as social and economic conditians of the regian, nat 
to mentian the nature of viticulture changed. Three areas of patential canflicts can be 
26 Ferrer, 1987, p.260 and Costa i Via, 1993, p.332. Valls (1996, p.168) gives an average 
of 2 hectares in L I Anoia for the eighteenth century. 
27 Calculated from Colomé, 1997, pp.315 and 550. 
28 JCA, 1891, p.xxxi and Roig Armengol, 1890, pp. 178 and 179. For the use ofploughs 
in viticulture, see SiInpson, farthcoming. 
29 According to Ferrer, 1987, pp. 162-3 most vats were between 30 and 100 hectolitres in 
Bages region in 1860, the equivalent to the production of about 1.5 to 6 hectares. Roig 
Armengol, 1890, p.215, writing of the same area noted that, "the supply of wine is found in 
the hands of hundreds of small growers, and those cellars with between a thousand or two 
thousand hectolitres, are considered as extraordinary" , 
10 
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identified: changes in civillaw, movements in relative prices and the allocation of new 
costs arising out of changes in taxation or cultivation requirements. We shall examine each 
in tumo 
One difficulty was the interpretation of the length of the contract itself. As we have 
seen, the traditional rabassa morta contracts were suppose to remain in operation until two 
thirds of the vines had died. However, unless hit by disease, vines were unlikely to die 
altogether, and it was in neither parties interest to see harvests declining slowly because 
dead, or dying, plants were not being replaced. Furthermore, the clause that the rabasser 
should follow the "good farming practices" of the region, was widely interpreted lo imply 
that they should replant a dead or dying vine by trailing shoots from a neighboring planto 
Once this had taken root, it would be detached from the mother planto Therefore, until the 
disease phylloxera made its appearance in the region in the 1880s, the vineyard's life was 
often considered indefinite. 
Sorne contemporaries claimed that by allowing sharecroppers to replant, the rabassa 
Dl.QI1a was little different from other contracts, such as the fu.r.Q in Galicia, implying that 
ownership of the dominium utile was in the hands of the tenant, who simply had to pay an 
annual rent (~). The attempts at stricter legal definition of land ownership in the 
eighteenth century made owners take more serious the question of the vineyard' s natural 
life, and in 1765 the Real Audiencia de Cataluña made the replanting dead vines illegal. 30 
However, it was not in the land owners' interest to receive back a dying vineyard and 
consequently their angle of attack changed, and in 1778 the Real Audience of Cataluña 
declared that replanting could take place, but the life of the vineyard was to be taken as 50 
years. Fifteen years later, in 1793, the Council of Castilla ruled that the life of the vineyard 
could not be taken as an arbitrary 50 years, and so the question was left open once again. 31 
The potential problem of land ownership appeared again in 1873, when a new civil code 
30 The Council of Castile in 1763 had prohibited the expulsion of tenants (foreros) in 
Galicia, but it was not until1926 that they were given the legal right to purchase the land 
without the permission of landlords. See Villares, 1982, p.260. 
31 Balcells, 1980, pp.41-43. 
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identified the rabassa morta, along with other contracts such as the fum, as being perpetual 
and gave the sharecropper the legal right to purchase the land if they so wished. However, 
the law was quickly revoked, and the new civil code of 1889 identified the length of the 
contract as being fifty years, unless sorne other fixed term had been established between the 
two parties. The rapid destruction of vines by phylloxera would make this new decision 
irrelevant. 
Once possible source of information on how this changing legal scenario affected 
landowners might be found in modification of the contracts themselves. However the 
behaviour of landowners and rabassers were also influenced by movements in wine prices 
and labour costs (Graphs 1 and 2).32 Conditions for production appear to have especially 
favourable in the period 1690-1740 and 1840-1885, with the wine:wheat ratio moving 
aboye the long term trend. By contrast, conditions seem to have worsened at the end of the 
eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries. This fact, together with the legal 
questions outlined aboye, perhaps help explain two changes in the rabassa morta contracts. 
In the first instance, the legal disputes of the late eighteenth century might be expected to 
have encouraged landowners to have specified in the contracts an exact number of years, 
rather than the vague concept of waiting until two thirds of the vines had died. Yet the 
legal rulings do not seem to have had an inunediate effect. A notary in the Penedes district 
still drew up sorne 90 per cent of the new contracts by the natural life of the vines in the 
1820s, although by the 1850s the figure had fallen to 55 per cent, and by the 1880s there 
33 
were none. The explanation of this delay can perhaps be traced to movements in 
conunodity prices, with the weakness in wine and spirit prices from the late 1810s to the 
32 It should be noted that information comes from conunercial centres and that, especially 
prior to the railways, many farmers in other areas of Cataluña might face a quite different set 
of prices. Furthermore, agricultural wages give only a very rough indication of the 
opportunity cost of labour, as the use of wage labour was rare outside of the harvest. 
Information is unavailable for the period 1805-20. 
33 Pares Goncer, 1944, pp. 16-9. An important problem with using written contracts as a 
source to measure change over time is that they sometimes simply legalized what had been 
previously an oral contract. See for example, the criticism of Moreno (1995) of the 
conclusions reached by Colomé y Valls, 1994, pp.51-2. 
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late 1840s making it difficult for farmers to attract new sharecroppers. There was also a 
small, but clear increase in the share of the harvest that new sharecroppers had to pay to 
the landowner during the period 1850-85 compared to 1800-45 (Graph 3). This might be 
caused by either landlords taking advantage of the healthier wine prices that producers 
enjoyed, or their need to offset new costs. The first appearance of oidium (powdery 
mildew) in the region in 1852 implied that sharecroppers had to spray sulphur during most 
years, which was assessed as 15 per cent of production costs by the tax authorities in 
1863.34 Another new cost was the land tax of 1845, which in the Bages and Penedes was 
considered the landowner' s legal responsibility, although with the rabassers contributing a 
part to the landowner; in Pla del Llobregat, the situation was reversed. 35 
In more general terms, if the rabasser could end the contract by selling their vines, 
the landowner could only recover full possession of the land if the rabasser failed to 
comply with the conditions stipulated in the contract. Yet the comparative advantage that 
catalan farmers enjoyed in viticulture before the twentieth century implied that this was 
rarely a problem for landowners, and there appear to have been few attempts to evict 
tenants for inefficient cultivation. In part, this might be because of the legal cost,36 but at 
times of high wine prices, such as in the 1870s, both rabasser's and landowners' interests 
coincided in the need to maximize output from the land. By contrast, when prices were 
weak such as at the beginning of the twentieth century, or when the supply of family labour 
was considered by the rabasser as excessive for the area of land, there was an incentive for 
the rabasser to look for off-farm employment, for at least part of the time. Outside the 
harvest, wage labour was rare in Catalan farming, but if the landowner worked sorne of his 
own land, then skilled labour was be required for such tasks as pruning.37 However,of 
34 Giralt, 1990, 2, p.230. 
35 Ibid., pp.153-4. However, the rabasser benefitted from the abolishing of various taxes 
of the Ancien Regime, such as the tithe (1841). 
36 Santamaría, 1878, p.123. 
37 If the landowner also farmed sorne of his own land, then they might reward efficient 
rabassers by making them temporary managers (masovers) of their own estates. Aguiló y 
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greater importance in regions such as Bages or L'Anoia, were the employment 
opportunities found in rural industry. By contrast, for the landlord, a period of low wine 
prices together with the low opportunity cost of the land implied that there would have had 
difficulty in replacing sharecroppers. 
3. Sharecroppjng and conflicts. 1890s-1920s. 
The external shocks that both parties faced during our first period were 
comparatively mild compared to those that appeared from the last few years of the 
nineteenth century. First, wine production in Cataluña fe11 significant1y because of 
phy11oxera, a disease which would in time destroy virtua11y a11 of Europe's vines. The 
on1y effective long-term solution was the uprooting of the dead vines, the planting with 
American phy110xera resistant plants, which were then grafted with European varieties. As 
French vineyards suffered first, this remedy was already known in Cataluña, and the 
technical problem was therefore limited to one of adaptation, namely determining which 
hybrids were most suited to local conditions, and to instructing growers on the new 
cultivation techniques required. A second problem was that wine prices, which had 
doubled between 1869171 and 1884/86 as a result of France's heavy imports to make up 
the shortfa11 in its domestic production, started to decline from the late 1880s, just as 
phy110xera began to devastate Cataluña's own vines. From the ear1y twentieth century, the 
widespread replanting of vines throughout Europe, the increase in output in new wine 
producing countries such as AIgeria, and a slowing in national and international demand, 
a11 contributed to keep wine prices depressed.38 
Cortés (1897, pp.93-5) mentions these contracts for 3 years, although sometimes they were 
longer. These contracts could not be inherited. Ferrer, 1987, p.478. 
38 In the case of France, for example, per capita consumption peaked in 1926. Pech, 1975, 
pp.98-9 and 192. 
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In Cataluña, three problems had now to be overcome, namely the replanting of the 
dead or dying vines, the need to adapt to lower wine prices and lastly, peculiar to our 
region, the need for landowners to decide whether to renegotiate contracts with their 
sharecroppers as phylloxera, which had destroyed the vines, brought to an end the old 
ones. In Barcelona, perhaps the province where the rabassa morta had greatest importance, 
the area under vines fell from 132 thousand hectares in 1889 to less than 36 thousand in 
1898, before replanting allowed a recovery to 115 thousand hectares by 1906, a figure 
which was maintained until the Civil War. 39 In general, most landowners continued to use 
sharecropping contracts after phylloxera, rather than resorting to direct cultivation, despite 
the fact that in France's Midi, technological change was reducing monitoring costs, 
allowing an increase in the scale of viticulture and the use of wage labour.4o Furthermore, 
if sharecropping had been considered as the key to the initial expansion of viticulture and 
the regional prosperity prior to phylloxera, it was now often seen as a major source of 
conflict.41 The rest of the paper considers how this change carne about. 
One possibility is that new contracts were signed, not because sharecropping was 
now considered to be the most efficient form to work the land, but rather as a compromise, 
because neither party could rid themselves of the other. In this case, even though the 
landowners would have preferred direct cultivation using wage labour, the costs of 
establishing, hectare by hectare, legal rights to the land and evict the rabassers was 
considered excessive; likewise, although the rabassers believed that the land belonged both 
morally and legally to them after they had cultivated ít for so long, they realized that it 
would difficult and expensive to have this fact established by a court of law. A 
39 By 1935 the figure was 121 thousand hectares. The pre-phylloxera figure is given in 
Ministerio de Fomento, 1911, p. 106 and thejournal, Los vinos y los aceites, 1891, pp.278-
9. Post-phylloxera figures from GEHR, 1991, p.278. 
40 The evídence of a switch to direct cultivation was rare. An exception was Raventós who 
increased the area after phylloxera to 100 hectares in 1907, and used 36 full time workers, 
with a further 260 at the harvest. Raventós, 1910, p.61. 
41 The Instituto de Reformas Sociales (lRS) was given the task to investigate these 
conf1icts, and reported in 1923. 
15 
compromise therefore suggests a path dependent argument, in which an inefficient 
instítution was continued, because to establish an alternative would have involved excessive 
transaction costs. This hypothesis is difficult to test, but neither wine prices nor labour 
costs were moving in a favourable direction to encourage landowners to turn to direct 
cultivation. Graph 4 shows that in the departemeot of Herault in France's Midi, most 
replanting took place in aclimate of high wine prices, and Postel-Vinay has drawn 
attention to the importance of bank loans in encouraging this process, especially for large 
estates.42 Therefore if growers in Barcelona could take advantage of the technical advances 
from southern France because phylloxera had struck earlier, they suffered in turn because 
their own replanting occurred after prices had collapsed (Graph 5). Little is known of 
Cataluña's credit markets at this time but, especially after the 1891 cornmercial treaty 
limited Spain' s export possibilities with France, banks are likely to have been wary in 
lending excessively to replant the region's vines. Once again, landowners therefore turned 
to the sharecropping to offset, at least partially, the cost1y investments needed for clearing 
the land of the old vines, and planting new ones. Likewise, sharecroppers saw new 
contracts as the best way both of replacing the capital that they had lost with phylloxera, 
and sharing the greater risks associated with the new vines. Therefore, the evidence does 
not suggest that landlords seriously contemplated alternatives, or that sharecroppers were 
unhappy with renewing new contracts, at least in the initial period after phylloxera.43 
42 Postel-Vinay, 1989, pp. 162-72. Replanting in the Midi took place on the deeper, fertile 
soils of the plains rather than the stony soils of the hills. The move to the plains required the 
draining of marshes, which "could on1y be tack1ed by large-scale landowners or limited 
companies with sufficient funds for the organization of drainage and irrigation" (de Planhol, 
1994, p.350). 
43 For example in the 1890s, the landowner's journal, the Reyista del Instituto Agrícola 
Catalán de San Isidro dedicated very few articles to the problems associated with contracts, 
but numerous ones on replanting techniques, problems of grafting, etc.. This was also the 
case in the congresses held in San Sadunú d'Anoia (1898) and Reus (1899). Likewise, during 
the difficult interwar years, rabassers in the important wine producing region of the Panedes 
spoke high1y of the traditional rabassa morta contracts, but claimed that the landowners had 
"destroyed" it, in prejudicial to aH parties". IRS, 1923, p.29. 
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If sharecropping contracts continued to be used, there were legal changes. The 
1889 civil code encouraged landowners to use another sharecropping contract 
(arrendamiento a partes de frutos), rather than the traditional rabassa morta, as conditions 
for possible eviction of tenants in breach of contract were considered easier. However, to 
all intents and purposes, the contracts remained the same in all but name, and even then, 
most contemporaries still referred 10 the new contracts as "rabassa morta". The vines were 
usually planted by the sharecropper, eviction could only take place when some term of the 
contract had been broken, compensation had to be paid unless the tenant was evicted, and 
the sharecropper remained the legal owner of the vines that he had planted.44 Whereas it is 
true that many of the new contracts were now shorter, their duration was still usually 
longer than the life of the post-phylloxera vines, thereby preserving the spirit of the 
"rabassa morta" .45 The problems associated with sharecropping in Cataluña after 1889 
were not caused by the changes in the civil code, but rather they resulted from a marked 
increase in the incentives for postcontractual opportunistic behaviour on the part of the 
tenant. We shall consider two areas why this took place, namely changes in the nature of 
viticulture, and movements in relative prices. 
Traditional viticulture used, as we have seen, primarily inputs of land and labour. 
With the rabassa morta, the sharecropper provided the labour and the landlord the land, 
with the harvest divided between the two on the basis of their valuation of their respective 
contributions. The vines were the property of the rabasser. Phylloxera therefore destroyed 
both the rabasser's capital and future income. In contrast to when the original vines were 
planted, technology by the late nineteenth century was beginning to provide an alternative 
44 As we shall see, a number of landowners would now plant vines themselves, in which 
case the sharecropper was not the owner. For compensation, see IRS, 1923, pp.42, 89-90, 
112 and 192. The impact of these legal changes are dealt with in detail in Carmona and 
Simpson, in preparation. 
45 Average contracts were now for between 30 and 50 years. The life of the post-
phylloxera vines was only 20-5 years, against 50 or 60 years for the pre-phylloxera vines. 
Balcells, 1980, p.69 and 68. There was now an additional problem in that, neither 
landowner or sharecropper knew how long the new vines would live. 
17 
; I 
to sorne of the heavy inputs of labour. Specialized machinery now existed which could 
remove the dead plants, and ploughs (Yernette) drawn by winches, worked the soil to a 
depth of half a metre, to help prepare the land for replanting. Although there appears to 
have been a rapid growth in the presence of deep ploughs in Cataluña just in the period 
when vineyards needed replanting, one observer noted that "most of the land is worked by 
sharecroppers whose on1y capital is their labour and yet, without instruments to cultivate 
deeply, they are capable of creating a vineyard with american vines". However, deeper 
ploughing was considered essential if vine yields were to be increased significantly.46 
Therefore growers who replanted using labour intensive systems, suffered lower yields to 
those who had the capital to rent the new machinery. Vines now also had to be purchased 
from nurseries, rather than taken from a neighbouring planto Finally, the post-phylloxera 
vines were much more susceptible to disease, requiring expenditure on chemicals, 
especial1y sulphur for oidium and cooper salts or "Bordeaux mixture" for mildew. By the 
1920s, chemicals and their spraying represented almost a fifth of annual cultivation costs 
(Table 1). Therefore at the precise moment when the sharecropper's capital was destroyed 
by disease, he was required to provide a significant investment if the contract was to be 
renewed under the same terms lO those that he had enjoyed prior to phyl1oxera. Many 
sharecroppers did not have sufficient resources, and instead part or al1 of the investments 
was provided by the landlord. Furthermore the choice of suitable vine stock was 
complicated, and sorne landlords found themselves drawn into a more active management 
of the vineyard than they had been accustomed to in the past. As a result, sorne 
landowners planted the new vineyards themselves using hired machinery, and then leased 
them on long contracts to the sharecropper.47 In these cases, not only did the sharecropper 
46 Rovira, in Congreso Vitícola de Reus, 1899, p.27. Rovira makes an interesting 
comparison between high yields and "intensive" viticulture, and low yields and less intensive 
viticulture which, he implies, was the model followed by most sharecroppers. As we show 
elsewhere (Simpson, forthcoming), it was the "high intensive" viticulture in southern France 
which was technological path chosen by many growers. 
47 However, in these cases the sharecropper often had to buy the vines that had been 
planted by the owner. See for example, Instituto Agrícola Catalan de San Isidro, 1923, 
pp.43-4 and 82-3. 
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lose control of the vines, but they were required to pass on a higher percentage of the 
harvest to the landowner. Even if it was the sharecropper who planted, and thus 
maintained the vines as his property, a higher share of the harvest was required by the 
landowner for his contribution to the cost of chemicals and fertilizers. Both the loss of 
ownership of the vines, and a sma11er share of the harvest, reduced incentives for the 
sharecropper. 
A second problem was the movement of relative prices. Although information is 
limited, it appears that the indefinite nature of the original rabassa morta contracts did not 
create major problems prior to the late nineteenth century (Graph 1). By contrast, between 
1890 and 1930, wine prices fe11 both with respect to bread prices, and in particular with 
respect to wage costs (Graph 2).48 Even as replanting was taking place, the return on unit 
labour inputs in viticulture was declining steeply compared to what could be earned by 
unskilled wage labour, both within agriculture and industry. Given the close proximity of 
the rapidly growing and prosperous industrial city of Barcelona, which saw its population 
jump from around 270 thousand in 1887 to a million in 1930, it is not surprising that 
sharecroppers felt that their living standards were slipping compared to other groups of 
workers. 
The loss of ownership of the vines for sorne sharecroppers, a reduced share of the 
harvest for others, and the decline in the opportunity cost of a11 sharecroppers' labour, 
implied that incentives for postcontractual opportunistic behaviour increased significant1y. 
The response oí' landowners was to identify with greater c1arity in the contracts how the 
sharecropper was required to cultivated the vines, suggesting an important increase in 
monitoring costs if the vines were going to be cultivated according to the "us i costum de 
bon pagés". Neither was it the case that the sharecropper's loss was the landowner's gain 
(Table 2). The higher vine yields and the larger share of the harvest that landowners 
enjoyed were not sufficient in general to offset the weak wine prices of the periodo Both 
48 The opportunity cost is difficult to measure, but most land which was not replanted with 
vines after phy110xera was abandoned to rough pasture or, on occasions, to extensive cereals 
or olives. See, for example, Ministerio de Fomento, 1911. 
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parties therefore found cause for complaint, and this provided the background for, first a 
decline in social capital, and then open conflict between the two groups, as we shall see 
below. 
Another problem facing both landowner and sharecropper by the early twentieth 
century was that the rising cost of labour and declining real wine prices everywhere were 
leading to greater competition between producers. Whereas in Cataluña production 
remained essentially based on the family farm, in other regions, such as France's Midi 
region, there was an increase in the size of vineyards, with those of more than 40 hectares 
(producing over 2,000 hectolitres of wine) accounting for 48 per cent of the harvest by 
1897-1902.49 With the greater scale carne a significant increase in investment per hectare 
so that, although the area under vines in the Midi was similar in the late 1920s as it had 
been in the early 1870s, yields had increased by two thirds. 50 To work the larger 
vineyards, growers in the Midi reduced significantly the monitoring problems in the use of 
wage labour outlined in section 1. In part this was achieved through changes in 
technology. Vines were increasingly hung from trellises in long lines to facilitate the use of 
ploughs between the lines. 51 As supervisors could easily walk between the rows to check 
an individual' s work, this allowed greater control over the speed and the quality, of 
cultural operations such as pruning, spraying, cultivation and harvesting. Trellises were 
not generally used in Cataluña, in part, because the density of vines per hectare was less 
than in the Midi. However phylloxera allowed a more rational planting in Cataluña too, 
which facilitated the greater use of ploughs and fewer problems in carrying out, and in 
theory of monitoring, other operations. 
The real difference between these two regions would seem to lie elsewhere. In the 
Midi the increase in importance of large estates of over 40 hectares was accompanied by a 
49 Between 1871/2 and 1927/9 yields in the Midi increased from 37 hectolitres to 61 
hectolitres. Pech, 1975, pp. 142 and 149. By contrast in Barcelona, yields rose a third, from 
18 hectolitres to 27 hectolitres. Table 2. 
50 Yields refer to 1871/2 and 1927/9. Pech, 1975, pp.496-8. 
51 The importance of this was emphasized to us by Ann Carlos. 
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similar increase of those of less than 10 hectares. Skilled labour was required on the large 
estates, especially for pruning, and this was initially obtained from the locally resident 
smallholders. Patronage appears to have played an important role, with the large owners 
lending equipment and the use of their wineries to small vintners in return for labor 
services on their estates after phylloxera.52 In this case the demand for skilled labour on 
the estates, and the excess supply on the small farms reinforced each other. Monitoring 
costs were kept low by both the greater ease in measuring work quality, and the fact that 
small growers were interested in being recruited from one year to the next for seasonal 
work. Improved monitoring allowed labour to be increasingly recruited from outside the 
village - including from Spain. 53 Frader notes the appearance of gang labour (~), 
which consisted of 10 to 15 skilled vinedressers, who contracted for employment, and 
which had the advantage in that both organization and monitoring was effectively 
subcontracted.54 Behind this success in controlling monitors costs, was the capacity of 
large producers in identifying their own economic problems, with those of the whole 
region, a feature which was in direct contrast to that in Cataluña. 
The declining share of the harvest that the sharecropper received after phylloxera in 
Cataluña, and the growing opportunity cost of the labour, reduced incentives to work the 
vines carefully, especially in the interwar period (see Table 1). This was a period of both 
rapid industrialization and growing nationalism in Catalan society, and this helped turn 
what was essentially an economic problem of low prices, into a political one of 
landownership. In complete contrast with France's Midi, where the problems of low wine 
prices in the early 1900s helped cement the interests of the large estate owners 
(propiétaires) with the small growers (cultiyateurs), and led to the founding of a pressure 
group for the sector, Confédération gérérale des vignerons du Midi, in Cataluña low prices 
divided landowners and sharecroppers into two conflicting political groups.55 Here 
52 Frader, 1991, p.36. 
53 Smith, 1975, p.371. 
54 Frader, 1991, pp.75 and 92. 
55 For the Midi, see especially Smith, 1975 and 1978. 
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landowners, through organizations such as the FederaciÓn A~rícola Catalana-Balear or the 
Instituto A~rícola Catalán de San Isidro, lobbied the government for reduced land taxes or 
a fiscal solution to low wine prices, while their congresses limited themselves to discussion 
on to the technical problems related to the planting of the new american vines, By 
contrast, whereas the legal grounds for most sharecroppers to full membership of their 
property was small, the growing conflicts with Catalan society encouraged the rabassers to 
look for a distributional solution - namely the full ownership of the land, rather than a 
sectorial one - incentives to limit wine fraud, reduced taxation, etc., as was the case with 
small growers in France.56 This polarization of Catalan society inevitably had i~portant 
consequences for the efficiency of sharecropping and greatly encouraged opportunistic 
behavior on the part of the sharecropper. Crucially, growers in the Midi appear to have 
been more successful than their counterparts in Cataluña, both in increasing yields 
significantly through the use of more and better inputs, while at the same time overcoming 
the traditional problems associated with monitoring. 
Conclusion. 
In this paper we have argued that the rabassa morta contract for centuries 
successfully balanced the need to provide incentives to the sharecropper, while at the same 
time allow the landowner to participate in the fluctuating fortunes of the local wine 
economy. These conditions were met, in general from the late seventeenth to the late 
nineteenth centuries. With the development of a more capital intensive viticulture, which 
increasingly provided opportunities to achieve economies of scale, and the more demanding 
nature of the new vines after phylloxera, these favourable conditions began to be eroded. 
First, the share of the harvest that growers received declined, which reduced their 
incentives in the cultivation of the vine. At the same time, wine prices in real terms 
56 The UniÓ de Rabassajres de Cata1uyna's program in 1923 contained no point which was 
not related to redistribution of power or income to them from the landlord. Quoted in 
Balcells, 1980, pp.383-4. The only area where landowners and sharecroppers joined forces 
was in a few wine cooperatives and, even then, severallocalities ended up having ~ 
cooperatives, one for the landowners and one for sharecroppers. 
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decline, and real wages soared, which increased the opportunity cost of sharecroppers 
labour. By 1930/4 wages of an unskilled agricultural male labourer in the Penedes were 
the equivalent to four times the quantity of wine that he would have eamed in 1880/4; 
yields, by contrast, had increased by only a third.57 But a decline in their relative position 
was not the only cause of the increasing conflicts between sharecroppers and landowners. 
Wider changes in the Spanish, and in particular, the Catalan society, led to a radicalization 
of politics, and the claim by sharecroppers for full ownership of the land. In such a 
climate the level of social capital declined significantly, increasing problems of monitoring 
and moral hazard for the owner. Sharecropping was no longer considered as an efficient 
contract, but rather as exploitative and unjust. 
57 Sources as Graph 2 and Table 2. 
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Table 1 
Cultivation costs in Cataluña (Tarragona) 
pre-phylloxera, annual cultivation costs 
pesetas % 
land 36,50 21,41 
planting costs: interest &depreciation 43,95 25,78 
ploughing &hoeing 61,50 36,07 
pruning 7,50 4,40 
harvesting &transport 13,75 8,06 
taxes 7,30 4,28 
170,50 100,00 
1900, annual cultivation costs 
land 65,00 15,85 
planting costs: interest &depreciation 112,15 27,34 
ploughing & hoeing 118,00 28,77 
pruning I 19,50 4,75 
chemicals I 60,00 14,63 
harvesting & transport 26,50 6,46 
taxes 9,00 I 2,19 
I 
! 410,15 100,00 
1921, annual cultivation costs 
land 75,00 10,65 
planting costs: interest & depreciation 183,92 26,12 
ploughing &hoeing 214,90 30,52 
pruning 41,00 5,82 
chemicals 128,74 I 18,28 
harvesting & transport 46,00 6,53 
taxes 14,60 2,07 
704,16 100,00 
Sources: Instituto de Reformas Sociales (1923), pp. 161-174. 
Table 2 
Wine production per hectare. 
wine yields (hls per wine prices output per hectare 
hectare) (pesetas per hl.) (pesetas) 
1876-80 18,0 28,1 505,1 
1881-85 18,0 I 41,1 739,8 
1886-90 17,5 32,6 572,3 
1891-95 21,0 
1896-00[ 22,4 
1901-051 26,7 21,3 570,0 
1906-101 16,2 I 15,9 254,1 
1911-15~ 20,2 I 26,9 464,6 
1916-20¡ 41,9 I 21,6 . 889,7 
1921-251 33,9 14,3 487,0 
1926-30: 27,8 I 18,2 I 516,0 
1931-35: 23,8 ! 15,1 362,6 
Sources: 
Yields: Simpson, 1985, pp.368-9; we take yields between 1876 and 1888 as 18hls.; 
Prices: Balcells, 1980, pp.377-8. Deflated by Maluquer de Motes, 1989, cuadros 12-11, 11-
12 and 12-16. 
Graph 1 
Trends in wine prices and wages in Barcelona, 1700-1805 
1,6 
1,4 
1,2 
1 
0,6 
0,8 
.. ' 
---wine Iwheat 
- - - - - -wages (unskilled day 
labour/wine prices) 
0,4 
0,2 
o 
o 
t-
..... 
o 
o 
N 
t-
..... 
o 
-.:t 
t-
..... 
o (() 
t-
..... 
o 
ro 
t-
..... 
o 
o 
ro 
..... 
ro 
o 
ro 
..... 
Sources: calculated from Feliu, 1991, vol. 1, pp.42-4, 87-92 and vol.2, pp. 122-4. Five year moving averages have been used (1730-1750=1). 
Graph 2 
Trends in wine prices and wages in Barcelona, 1820-1933 
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Sources: calculated from Balcells,1980, pp.376-379 and Garrabou, Pujol and Colomé, 1991, ppAO-2 and pA6. 
Five year moving average have been used (1850-1870=1) 
Graph 3 
Trend in the share of the Harvest paid by the "rabassers". Alt Penedés, 1815-1880. 
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Source: calculated from Colomé, 1990, p.138. Information refers to new contracts signed before a public notary. 
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Graph 4 
Wine prices and area ofvines. Hérault, 1874-1913 
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Graph 5 
Wine prices and area ofvines. Barcelona, 1874-1913. 
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